Papers:
- 'Linguistic Intuition: An Exercise in Linguistic Competence' (in draft): An account of the relation of linguistic intuitions to linguistic competence, which is intended to assuage recently bruited worries that intuition data might in principle not be of a sort that can provide evidence regarding linguistic competence. pdf
- 'Intellectualism and the Linguistics of Know wh constructions' (in draft): Embraces a modest intellectualism with respect to intentional action, but argues that recent arguments from the linguistics of know wh constructions of the sort recently offered by Jason Stanley and others offers no support for what is essentially an empirical psychological thesis.
- 'How to Be a Dispositionalist about the Attitudes' (in draft): Argues that a plausible dispositionalism (or causal role functionalism) about the attitudes must rest on a measurement-theoretic account of propositional attitude predicates, on pain of otherwise not being able to explain (i) the relational character of propositional attitude predicates, (ii) how the that-clauses of such predicates manage to play the attitude individuating role that they do, and (iii) the apparent intentionality, semantic evaluability, and inferential involvement of propositional attitudes.
- 'Natural Computation' (in draft): Asks how we should understand the claim that a certain natural (non-artifactual) object is capable of, or in fact performs, certain computations, if such objects or devices are not plausibly construed as executing an algorithm.
Book:
The Cultural Construction of Belief (large parts in draft): Presents a normative/regulative alternative to traditional mindreading accounts of the role of commonsense psychology in social cognition and coordination. Beginning with a criticism of mindreading accounts, the book argues that our commonsense psychology is a culture-specific niche construction that serves a primarily normative/regulative role. The book defends the proposed account against anticipated objections, most notably against universalist claims for our culture's commonsense psychology. The book concludes by arguing that on the proposed account belief and other propositional attitudes are most plausibly construed dispositionally.